

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

24 March 1970

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Abbot Smith

FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Some Thoughts on Opposition that Might
Be Forthcoming to the SMT Proposals for
Realigning the Soviet Military Estimates

1. The major changes involved in the proposed realignment
of Soviet military estimates would be:*

Adding appropriate sections of NIE 11-14
to the force estimates;

Moving ASW from NIE 11-14 to NIE 11-3;

Doing a new estimate on projection of
Soviet power and influence that would largely
(but not exclusively) deal with the discussion
of the Soviet navy removed from NIE 11-14; and

Moving peripheral attack from NIE 11-8 to
NIE 11-14.

* See table at annex on illustrative mechanics of proposed changes.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
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Our initial impression (without doing a market survey) is that changes would be increasingly difficult to sell as one moves down the list.

2. Adding appropriate sections of NIE 11-4 as a backup to the Force estimates would probably cause no problems, once we had explained what it is we are trying to do. The major problem would be what we contemplate doing then with NIE 11-4. There probably would be considerable resistance to doing away with NIE 11-4 in its entirety, but parts could be incorporated in other publications. Three ways immediately come to mind in which we could incorporate NIE 11-4 judgments into forms that would fit with the new outline.

(a) The "essay" on the strategic relationship could properly include some discussion of the political-military-bureaucratic-resource-R&D relationships as pertinent to the issue. It should probably do this in any case. Whether this would be amenable to coordination and still be the document we desire is debatable. The chances are probably less than even that a proper essay could be made into an estimate.

(b) An alternative approach, and one which would probably be more acceptable as a coordinated essay would be an estimate on "Soviet Policy". We urge that a Soviet policy paper be done to give the background and rationale of Soviet policy as we see it. But the scheduling of such an estimate should depend on a lot more than on the residual questions from NIE 11-4. It might better follow the next Central Committee meeting.

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(c) Thus a third approach would probably be most acceptable until a Soviet Policy estimate is done. This would be to have (as a short annex to each of the estimates) a paragraph or two on the military expenditures involved, with references to the total, and the share which they represent. This approach would have the advantage of tying the expenditures to the forces involved (and relating these to the total military and R&D budget and total expenditures and GNP) in the estimates in which the questions come up. There would be no easy way to talk about political-military-bureaucratic relationships in such force estimates, nor of the effect of military expenditures on the Soviet economy as a whole, but these are better discussed in a Soviet Policy paper than in a military policy paper in any case.

3. Moving ASW from NIE 11-14 to NIE 11-3 will probably not have the opposition from the Navy this year that it would have engendered last year. Many Polaris vulnerability studies in the DOD have conditioned the Navy to the extent that it will probably now admit that Soviet ASW is aimed at Polaris, and is thus properly against US strategic forces rather than primarily against US general purpose forces. Aside from Navy opposition, there is unlikely to be much of a demurrer; in fact Air Force thinks it's a great idea, for reasons largely parallel to the Navy's opposition. The main problem would be in sorting out just what forces should be talked about under ASW, especially of the ships in the surface fleet. This will have to be done carefully, but it's difficulty should not deter us.

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4. A new estimate on projection of Soviet power and influence will involve the usual problems of deciding what to include and what to exclude. A potentially messy problem is whether to consider the major surface ships (such as guided missile cruisers) as primarily a means of projecting Soviet power or of countering US expeditionary forces in support of NATO in Europe. Probably no clear distinction should be made, but the pertinent capabilities talked about in both estimates. Thus we should have a detailed outline before we surface the proposal. Various US naval commands have, however, periodically asked for judgments on Soviet maritime capabilities in general and what they are up to in the Mediterranean in particular. Such requestors would be the main consumers -- along with State -- and might be expected to support a proposal for this proposed new estimate. There may also be some opposition to disbanding the general purpose forces estimate, but this was packaged for Systems Analysis in DOD in the first place, and their methods of packaging may not still be paramount in most reader's thinking.

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5. The hardest proposal to sell, and one likely to have some determined Air Force (and perhaps DIA) opposition will be the inclusion of Soviet peripheral attack capabilities in NIE 11-14, Soviet Forces for Attack in Eurasia. The opposition will be blunted to some degree by the change in title; in fact it would not sell without the change. But someone is bound to point out that Soviet MRBMs and ICBMs are both in the SRF, and medium and heavy bombers both in the LRA, and that since the Soviets thus think of peripheral attack and intercontinental attack in the same organizational package, we should package our estimates in this manner also. The best counters to this line of argument would be that a) first of all, US attitudes toward an attack by the USSR in Europe (and our means and methods of response to such an attack) are different from those in the case of an attack on the continental US; consequently b) Soviet capability to attack the continental US is a far different intelligence problem as far as the US is concerned, and should be handled in a separate estimate, and c) although strategic attack in Eurasia might involve forces organizationally independent of the general purpose forces, the purpose of such attack would almost certainly be in support of a general purpose theater force attack. Although it is probably true that a

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nuclear attack in Europe by Soviet peripheral attack forces would bring a US intercontinental response, there is still a more distinct nuclear firebreak between ICBMs on the one hand and peripheral and theater forces on the other, than between ICBMs and peripheral forces on the one hand and theater forces on the other. A case in point is the SS-12, which fills in the previously existing firebreak that existed between Soviet theater forces and MRBM forces. Thus it can be argued that with the movement of the firebreak upwards, the estimates should recognize this and move in the same direction.

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ILLUSTRATIVE MECHANICS OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY ESTIMATES

(numbers refer to pages of text)

<u>Old Estimate</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>New Estimate</u>
11-8 Strategic Attack 26	Move: peripheral attack to 11-14 (-8) Add: Strategic Relationship from 11-4 (+4)	11-8 Intercontinental Attack 22
11-3 Strategic Defense 19	Add: ASW from 11-14 and beef up (+3)	11-3 Strategic Defense 22
11-14 General Purpose Forces 31	Add: peripheral attack from 11-8 but cut down (+6) Add: Problems in Europe and the Far East from 11-14 (+4) Remove: Navy, except for peripheral attack capabilities (-6)	11-14 Attack in Eurasia 35
Not done	Base on Projection of Power and Influence from 11-4 (+3) Add: much of Navy from 11-14 (+4) Add: long range sealift and air lift from 11-14 (+1) Add: other capabilities (+6) - Maritime - Military aid (Emphasize resupply capabilities) - Bases	11-? Projection of Power and Influence 14

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